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Continuing Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act
by Pharmaceutical Patent Holders and the
Failure of the 2003 Amendments
MATrHEW AVERY*

Today I call upon the brand-name industry to cease and desist from
inventing new games, that they work with us to re-balance the brandname and generic systems, and that they return to the scientific
research that they are good at and that has been their real
contribution.
-Representative Henry A. Waxman'
INTRODUCTION

The pharmaceutical industry is one of the few industries that
requires patent protection to ensure the profitability of its innovative
products.2 Because the drug discovery process has a high failure rate,3
enormous costs are associated with identification, development, and
testing of new drug candidates Of course, not every approved drug
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2009; M.S. Chemical
Engineering, Stanford University, 2004; B.S. Chemical Engineering and Material Science &
Engineering (double major), University of California, Berkeley, 2001. The Author would like to thank
Professor Robin Feldman for advising him on this Note. The Author would also like to thank Dr.
Alfred Server of WilmerHale LLP, Boston, MA, who recommended the topic for this Note as part of
the U.C. Hastings Law and Biosciences (LAB) Project. This Note was selected as a finalist in the
American Intellectual Property Law Association's 2oo8 Watson Writing Competition.
I. Press Release, Henry A. Waxman, Representative Henry A. Waxman on the Delay of
Approval of Generic Drugs (Nov. 20, 2001), available at http://www.citizen.org/congress/reform/
drug-patents/bmsg/articles.cfrn?ID=6496.
2. Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and
Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) 23-25 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 7552, 2000) (reporting that, according to a 1994 survey, the pharmaceutical industry is one
of the rare sectors that uses patents to appropriate rents); see also I FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTICIPATING
THE 21ST CENTURY: COMPETITION IN THE NEW HIGH-TECH, GLOBAL MARKETPLACE

ch.6, at 7 (1996)

(describing a study demonstrating that only 40% of pharmaceutical inventions would have been
developed in the absence of patent protection), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/global/report/
gcvi.pdf.

3. See J.F. Pritchard et al., Making Better Drugs: Decision Gates in Non-Clinical Drug
Development, 2 NATURE REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 542, 542 (2003) (describing failure risks associated with
drug discovery).

4. See Joseph A. DiMasi & Henry G. Grabowski, The Cost of Biopharmaceutical R&D: Is
[171]
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candidate generates sufficient sales to ensure an adequate return on the
pioneer's massive initial investment. According to one estimate, only
three out of every ten marketed drugs are commercially successful
enough for the pioneer to recoup its research and development
expenses.' Appropriate patent protection allows drug developers to
shoulder these risks by granting them exclusionary rights for a limited
time.
Once a pharmaceutical product loses patent protection, competitors
almost always introduce generic versions of the drug.6 Generic drugs can
capture 8o-9o% of the market, often within months of entering the
marketplace.' In response to generic competition, patent holders have
used a variety of controversial means to effectively extend their patentgranted monopoly." While it is important that pharmaceutical pioneers
remain profitable so that they have an incentive to continue developing
life-saving drugs,9 they should not be allowed to reap monopoly profits
indefinitely.'" Delays in the marketing of generic drugs directly interest
consumers, since the "availability of a generic alternative can mean a
price savings for consumers equal to one quarter of the price of the
brand-name drug."" Consequently, actions by patent holders that hinder
generic competition should be closely examined for impropriety.
Biotech Different?, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION EcON. 469, 477 (2007) (calculating average research

and development costs of $1.32 billion per new molecule approved by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA)).
5. See Paying off Generics to Prevent Competition with Brand Name Drugs: Should It Be
Prohibited?:Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, iioth Cong. 15o (2007) [hereinafter Paying
off Hearing] (statement of Billy Tauzin, President and Chief Executive Officer, Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers of America).
6. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, How INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS
AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 37 n.2 (1998) (reporting that 95% of

off-patent drugs had generic equivalents in 1994).
7. For example, the generic form of Prozac (fluoxetine) claimed approximately 65% of the
market within a month of generic entry, 8o% by the end of the first generic competitor's 18o-day
exclusivity period, and leveled out at almost 9o% after a year of generic competition. See Benjamin G.
Druss et al., Listening to Generic Prozac: Winners, Losers, and Sideliners, 23 HEALTH AFF. 210, 214
(2O04).

8. Saami Zain, Sword or Shield? An Overview and Competitive Analysis of the Marketing of
"Authorized Generics," 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 739, 742 (2OO7) ("Recently, under the rubric of 'Lifecycle
Management,' consultants and pharmaceutical executives have been encouraging various actions to
squeeze the most profitability from existing drugs. Certain of these actions have been criticized as
unethical, anticompetitive or even fraudulent." (footnote omitted)).
9. Carmelo Giaccotto et al., Drug Prices and Research and Development Investment Behavior in
the PharmaceuticalIndustry, 48 J.L. & EcoN. 195, 195 (2o05) (reporting a positive correlation between
profits and research spending).
io. Note that the standard patent term is twenty years from the date when the patent application
was filed. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2oo6). But because of the lengthy regulatory process, the average
pioneer drug only enjoys eleven to twelve years of patent protection after FDA approval. Paying off
Hearing,supra note 5, at 151-52.
ii. Andrew A. Caffrey, III & Jonathan M. Rotter, Note, Consumer Protection, Patents and

Procedure:Generic Drug Market Entry and the Need to Reform the Hatch-Waxman Act, 9 VA. J.L. &
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The market for generic drugs is regulated by the Hatch-Waxman
Act. 2 Paragraph IV of the Hatch-Waxman Act establishes a system
whereby generic manufacturers can seek to market generic equivalents
of a pioneer's patented drug prior to the patent's expiry.'3 But the
original Act also contained provisions that were exploited by patent
holders to delay generic competition, thereby extending their monopoly
sales. 4 These techniques were harshly criticized by generic
manufacturers, consumers, Congress, the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC), and the President, among others.'" In response, Congress
amended the Hatch-Waxman Act in 2003 to address these practices.
This Note focuses on analyzing how those amendments modified
loopholes in: (I) the use of reverse payments and authorized generics to
manipulate the I8o-day market exclusivity given to the first generic
challenger, and (2) the thirty-month stay granted to patent holders when
they sue Paragraph IV generic challengers. Part I of this Note provides a
brief background on the history and creation of the Hatch-Waxman Act.
Part II discusses in detail how features of the original Act were exploited
by patent holders to delay or thwart the entry of generic drugs. Part III
then introduces the 2003 revisions to the Hatch-Waxman Act, specifically
those revisions designed to counteract the abuses detailed in Part II.
Finally, Part IV analyzes the actual impact the 2003 revisions have had
on deterring abuse of the Act, identifies what areas are still open to
abuse, and recommends further amendments to mitigate these remaining
loopholes. 7
3-4 (2004) (citing CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6, at xiii).
12. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98
Stat. 1585 (1984) [hereinafter Hatch-Waxman Act] (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 3550) (2oo6),
35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 27I(e) (2006)).
13. 21 U.S.C. § 3550j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (20o0) (amended 2003).
14. See discussion infra Part II.
TECH. 1,

15. See discussion infra Part III.A.
16. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
IO8-173, 117 Stat. 2066 [hereinafter Medicare Modernization Act or "MMA"] (effective Dec. 8, 2003)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 and 42 U.S.C.).
17. It is beyond the scope of this Note to analyze the following issues related to the HatchWaxman Act: (i) biological generics, (2) medical devices, (3) patent term extensions due to delays in

regulatory approval, (4) antitrust issues, and (5) the section 271(e)(i) safe harbor. For a discussion of
biological generics, see generally Tam Q. Dinh, Potential Pathways for Abbreviated Approval of

Generic Biologics Under Existing Law and Proposed Reforms to the Law, 62 FOOD & DRUG L. 77
(2007). For a discussion of medical devices, see generally Andrew J. Paprocki's Note, Cardiac

Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc.: Can the Patent-Term Extension of the Hatch-Waxman Act
Be Used as Leverage in Drug PatentInfringement Settlements?, 46 JURIMETICS J. 471 (2006). Paprocki
discusses the unusual case where an infringing drug receives FDA approval before the patent holder's
drug, thereby preventing the patent holder from getting a patent term extension upon FDA approval.
Id. at 488 ("The [Hatch-Waxman Act] seems to permit an infringing drug developer to prevent a
pioneer drug manufacturer from obtaining a patent-term extension or to withhold the patent-term
extension as leverage in settlement negotiations."). For a discussion of antitrust issues, see generally
John Fazzio, PharmaceuticalPatentSettlements: Fault Lines at the Intersection of Intellectual Property
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HISTORY AND CREATION OF THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT

REGULATION OF GENERIC PHARMACEUTICALS UNDER THE FOOD, DRUG,
AND COSMETIC ACT

In order to market a new prescription drug, a pioneering
pharmaceutical company must first obtain regulatory approval from the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA).' 8 To obtain FDA approval, the
pharmaceutical company must perform extensive testing and analysis on
the new drug in order to provide the FDA with data on the drug's safety,
efficacy, pharmacology, and toxicology.'9 Once human clinical trials are
complete, the pioneer may then file a New Drug Application (NDA)
with the FDA, which "include[s] detailed reports of all animal studies
and clinical testing done with the drug, reports of any adverse reactions,
and any other pertinent information from worldwide scientific
literature.""0 After the FDA reviews and approves the NDA, the pioneer
may then commercially market its new drug.'
A generic drug is one that is "bioequivalent" to the brand-name
drug listed in an NDA. 2 Prior to the Hatch-Waxman Act (under the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA"), as amended in 1962), the
FDA required generic drug manufacturers to satisfy the same safety and
efficacy requirements as new drug applicants before allowing them to
market their products. 3 Generic manufacturers could not use the NDA
and Antitrust Law Require a Return to the Rule of Reason, i i J. TECH. L. & POL'Y I (20o6), and C. Scott
Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553 (2006). For a discussion of the section 27t(e)(I) safe harbor, see generally Sarah
J. Chickos, Navigating the Safe Harbor: Guidance from the Courts on Qualifying for the 35 U.S.C.
271(e)(i) Exemption from Patent Infringement of Health Care Related Inventions, 24 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 43 (2008).
i8. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2oo6) ("No person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into
interstate commerce any new drug, unless an approval of an application... is effective with respect to
such drug.").
19. 21 C.F.R. § 312.23 (2oo8).
20. Pennington Parker Landen, Federal Preemption and the Drug Industry: Can Courts CoRegulate?, 43 FoOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 85, too (1988); see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)-(b) (2006 & Supp. II
20o8); 21 C.F.R. § 314.50 (2008).
21. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a).
22. According to the FDA, "[a] generic drug is identical, or bioequivalent to a brand name drug
in dosage form, safety, strength, route of administration, quality, performance characteristics and
intended use. Although generic drugs are chemically identical to their branded counterparts, they are
typically sold at substantial discounts from the branded price." FDA, Office of Generic Drugs Home
Page, http://www.fda.gov/cder/ogd/ (last visited Nov. 13, 20o8). A generic drug is
bioequivalent to a listed drug if(i) the rate and extent of absorption of the drug do not show a significant difference
from the rate and extent of absorption of the listed drug when administered at the
same molar dose of the therapeutic ingredient under similar experimental conditions
in either a single dose or multiple doses.
21 U.S.C. § 3550)(8)(B).
23. Holly Soehnge, The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984: Fine-
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holder's data to demonstrate safety and efficacy, and were forced to
conduct their own clinical trials. 4 The great expense of conducting these
trials deterred the development of many generic drugs so much that, just
before the Hatch-Waxman Act was passed, the FDA estimated there
were approximately 150 brand-name drugs on the market with expired
patents but no generic equivalents. 5 Congress realized that introducing
generic equivalents of these off-patent drugs would save American
consumers hundreds of millions of dollars.26
Further stifling generic drug development was the fact that
performing the tests required for FDA approval during the pioneer's
patent term was generally considered an infringing use. In Roche
Products, Inc. v. Bolar PharmaceuticalCo., the Federal Circuit held that
using the active ingredient of a patented drug in tests required for FDA
regulatory approval was an act of infringement and not experimental use
because of its commercial purpose.27 Consequently, generic
manufacturers were forced to wait until the pioneer's patent term
expired before they could begin the development and approval processes
for their generic drugs. This gave pioneers a de facto extension of their
patent terms during the period the generic manufacturers spent testing
and seeking FDA review.28

B.

DRUG PRICE COMPETITION AND PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF

1984
In 1984, Congress effectively created the modern generic
pharmaceutical industry when it passed the Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, commonly known as the HatchWaxman Act. 9 The Act was intended "to balance two conflicting policy
objectives: to induce name-brand pharmaceutical firms to make the
investments necessary to research and develop new drug products, while
simultaneously enabling competitors to bring cheaper, generic copies of
those drugs to market."3 Hatch-Waxman provided for an abbreviated
new drug application (ANDA) for generic drugs.3 An ANDA applicant
Tuning the Balance Between the Interests of Pioneerand Generic Drug Manufacturers,58 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 51,52 (2003).
24. Id. at 53-54.
25. H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. I, at 17 (1984).

26. Id.
27. 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The Hatch-Waxman Act created an experimental use
exception for drug manufacturers that negated Roche. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(I) (2oo6).
28. Mary Atkinson, PatentProtectionfor Pharmaceuticals:A ComparativeStudy of the Law in the
United States and Canada, II PAC. RIM L. &POL'Y J. I8I, 184 (2oo2).
29. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. i585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 3550) (20o6), 35
U.S.C. §§ 156, 271(e) (2o06)).
30. Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 991 (D.C. Cir. 199o) (Edwards, J., dissenting); see also
H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. i,at 14-15.
31. See H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. i,at 16.
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is only required to demonstrate that its generic drug has the same active
ingredient, the same basic pharmacokinetics, and is bioequivalent to the
pioneer drug.3" But a generic applicant is no longer required to provide
independent proof of safety and efficacy, and can instead rely on the
pioneer's clinical trial data.33 The Hatch-Waxman scheme ensures the
quality of generic drugs, simplifies the generic approval process,
eliminates duplicative research costs associated with clinical trials, and
accelerates consumer access to affordable drugs.34 Upon ANDA
approval, the generic manufacturer may begin commercially marketing
its generic equivalent.
The Hatch-Waxman Act also created an experimental use exception
to patent infringement, providing that a "generic manufacturer may
obtain a supply of a patented drug product during the life of the patent
and conduct tests using that product if the purpose of those tests is to
submit an application to FDA for approval. ' ' , 6 This exception directly
overturned the holding of Roche, and now insulates generic
manufacturers from patent infringement liability for conducting clinical
research related to ANDA applications.37
All ANDA applicants are required to make one of the following
certifications regarding each patent that claims the drug they seek to
copy: (I) that the drug is not patented or that patent information has not
been filed; (1I) that the patent has expired; (III) the date when the patent
expires, and that the generic drug will not go on the market until that
date passes; or (IV) that the patent is invalid or will not be infringed by
the manufacture, use, or sale of the generic drug for which the
application is submitted. 3 These are commonly called Paragraph I, II, III,
and IV certifications, respectively.

32. 21 U.S.C. § 355(J)(2)(A)(ii)-(iv).
33. Id. § 355(J)(2)(A).

34. See Requirements for Submission of In Vivo Bioequivalence Data, 68 Fed. Reg. 61,640,
61,645 (proposed Oct. 29, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 314 & 320) (reporting estimates of

ANDA preparation and filing costs between $300,ooo and $i million); Thomas Chen, Note,
Authorized Generics:A Prescriptionfor Hatch-Waxman Reform, 93 VA.L. REV. 459, 464 (2007).

35. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a).
36. H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 5;see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(I) (2006) ("It shall not be an act

of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the United States or import into the United
States a patented invention ... solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission
of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or
veterinary biological products.").
37. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. Note that it is not clear whether the
section 271(e)(I) safe harbor protects researchers from infringement liability for using patented
"research tools" for drug research. See, e.g., Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193,
205 n.7 (2oo5); Amgen v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 519 F.3 d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Proveris Scientific
Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc.. 536 F-3d 1256, 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also Chickos, supra note 17.
38. 21 U.S.C. § 355(J)(2)(A)(vii)(I)-(IV).
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The certifications of primary interest are those made under
Paragraph IV, which occur when a generic manufacturer seeks FDA
approval to make a generic equivalent of a pioneer's drug before its
patent term has expired. A patent challenge pursuant to Paragraph IV is
a frequently deployed mechanism for the early introduction of generic
competition.39 When an applicant makes a Paragraph IV certification,
two special features of the Act apply: the thirty-month stay and the 18oday marketing exclusivity period.4"
i.
Thirty-Month Stay of ANDA Approval
The Hatch-Waxman Act provides that making a Paragraph IV
certification is itself an act of patent infringement.' The statute requires
all Paragraph IV ANDA applicants to provide notice of the application
to the challenged NDA/patent holder, including a detailed factual and
legal analysis explaining why the patent is either invalid or not
infringed.42 After receiving such notice, the NDA holder has forty-five
days to bring an infringement action against the ANDA applicant.43 If
suit is not filed within that time, the ANDA can be approved
immediately.' But if suit is brought during that time, then the FDA is
barred from approving the ANDA for thirty months.45 During this thirtymonth stay, the FDA can only "tentatively approve" the ANDA, such
that it can become effective immediately upon expiration of the stay.46
The only exceptions to the thirty-month stay are if either the patent
expires, or there is a district court finding of patent invalidity or
noninfringement during the stay, in which cases the ANDA can be
approved immediately.47
The purpose of the thirty-month stay is to protect NDA holders with
valid drug patents.1s The stay does this by allowing the patent holder to
sue the ANDA applicant for infringement before the generic challenger
enters the market.49 Congress believed that "this procedure fairly
FTC STUDY
challenges involving 13o drugs between 1984 and 2ooo); Examining the Senate and
House Versions of the "Greater Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act": Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, io8th Cong. 113, 117 (2003) (statement of Timothy Muris, Chairman, Federal
Trade Commission) (noting challenges involving more than eighty drugs between January 2ooi and
June 2003).
40. 21 U.S.C. § 355(J)(5)(A)-(B).
41. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) ("It shall be an act of infringement to submit... an [ANDA] for a
drug claimed in a patent or the use of which is claimed in a patent..
42. 21 U.S.C. § 355(J)(2)(B).
43. Id. § 355(J)(5)(B)(iii).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. § 3 5 5 (J)(5 )(B)(iv)(II)(dd).
47. Id. § 3 5 5 (J)(5 )(B)(iii)(l)-(IV).
48. H.R. REP. No. 98-857, Pt. i,at 28.
49. Id.
39. See

FED. TRADE COMM'N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN

1O (2002) (reporting
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balance[d] the rights of a patent owner to prevent others from making,
using, or selling its patented product and the rights of third parties to
contest the validity of a patent to market a product which they believe is
not claimed by the patent.""
2.
i8o-Day Marketing Exclusivity for the FirstANDA Applicant
The Hatch-Waxman Act provides that the first applicant to file a
Paragraph IV ANDA with the FDA will be granted i8o days of market
exclusivity upon entering the market with their generic equivalent." The
FDA will not approve later-filed ANDAs for the same drug until i8o
days after the first Paragraph IV ANDA applicant begins commercially
marketing a generic equivalent of the drug. 2 The first ANDA filer gets
the 18o-day exclusivity even if the patent holder never sues it for
infringement. 3 Therefore, during this period the first filer's product will
be the only generic equivalent on the market. The simple purpose of the
exclusivity period is to encourage Paragraph IV challenges by rewarding
the first filing applicant-"in exchange for undertaking the costs and
risks of patent litigation, the successful challenger is given [six] months of
marketing without any other generic competition."54 This exclusivity
period is very valuable to generic manufacturers,55 as they can sell their
product at a price significantly higher than they could if multiple generics
were on the market.:

50. Id.
51. 21 U.S.C. § 355(J)(5)(B)(iv).

52. Id. Prior to the Medicare Modernization Act, this clause also permitted approval of laterfiling applicants if there was a court decision of patent invalidity or noninfringement. This provision
has effectively moved into the forfeiture provisions of the Medicare Modernization Act. See discussion
infra Part III.C.
53. See Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 14o F.3d io6o, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (overturning an FDA
requirement that the first filer was only entitled to the 18o-day exclusivity if it successfully defended
against a patent infringement suit by the NDA holder); see also Purepac Pharm. Co. v. Friedman, 162
F. 3 d 1201, 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
54. Representative Henry Waxman, Speech at the Generic Pharmaceutical Association's First
Annual Policy Conference: Securing the Future of Affordable Medicine (Sept. 20, 2oo5), available at
http://www.house.gov/waxmanlnews files/news_statements-generic-pharmaceutical % 2oassociation_
9.20.05.htm.
55. See Leila Abboud, Drug Makers Use New Tactic to Ding Generics, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2004,
at Bi ("In 2002, when Barr successfully challenged the patent protection on Eli Lilly & Co.'s big
antidepressant Prozac, Barr got revenue of about $368 million from the new drug, or 31% of its total
for the year.").
56. For example, when generic Prozac (Fluoxetine) entered the market, the first generic
challenger sold it at $1.9i/capsule, or 12% below the cost of brand-name Prozac. Two months after the
exclusivity period expired, multiple generics had entered the market and the price of generic Prozac
had dropped to $0.32/capsule. Druss et al., supra note 7, at 213-14.
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LOOPHOLES IN THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT AND RELATED

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
A. INTRODUCTION

The onset of generic competition can be financially devastating to
pioneers while producing sizable profits for generic manufacturers.57
Naturally, patent holders have looked for ways to strategically exploit
the law to delay this competition. Representative Waxman has quipped
that "some of the most outstanding research happening at certain brandname drug companies is in the field of law."5 There has long been a
concern that patent holders have used loopholes in the Hatch-Waxman
Act to deter or delay generic competition.59 Additionally, an FTC study
specifically found that the provisions of the Act pertaining to i80-day
market exclusivity and the thirty-month stay were susceptible to abusive
strategies that delayed the approval of generic drugs. These abusive
strategies are described in detail in the following sections.
B.

THIRTY-MONTH STAY OF

ANDA

APPROVAL

As discussed above, a patent holder may sue a Paragraph IV ANDA
applicant for patent infringement if suit is filed within forty-five days of
receiving notice of the certification.6' If the suit is filed, the FDA will stay
approval of the ANDA for thirty months, or until a court decides the
patent is not infringed or invalid, whichever is earlier. 62 This thirty-month
stay provides the pioneer with a way to effectively extend the period of
market exclusivity beyond their normal patent term. 3
One abusive strategy pioneers used was to obtain multiple thirtymonth stays through the use of so-called "sham" patents, which claim
features peripherally related to the patented drugs, such as metabolites,
intermediates, and packaging features. 6' First, the pioneer obtained the
"sham" patent and then submitted it for listing in the FDA's Orange
Book. 65 When making a Paragraph I through IV certification, the ANDA
57. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6, at 28-31.

58. Waxman, supra note I.
59. See, e.g., Alfred B. Engelberg, Special Patent Provisions for Pharmaceuticals:Have They
Outlived Their Usefulness?, 39 IDEA 389, 414-19 (1999).
60. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 39, at i.
61. 21 U.S.C. § 355(J)(5)(B)(iii) (2oo6).
62. Id.
63. Lara J. Glasgow, Stretching the Limits of Intellectual PropertyRights: Has the Pharmaceutical
Industry Gone Too Far?, 41 IDEA 227, 233 (2OOl).

64. See Soehnge, supra note 23, at 73. The term "sham patent" is somewhat misleading and is not
meant to imply that the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office is improperly issuing invalid patents. In this
context, it is meant to refer to a patent that is filed for the purpose of engaging in "sham" litigation,
i.e., litigation that is baseless and pursued only for the purpose of interfering with a competitor's
business. See In re Buspirone Patent & Antitrust Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 363, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
65. The "Orange Book" is the common name for the FDA publication Approved Drug Products
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applicant must rely on Orange Book listings to determine what patents

cover the pioneer's drug. Consequently, after getting the sham patent
listed in the Orange Book, the NDA holder could claim that sale of a
generic equivalent would infringe the newly listed patent.6 Regardless of

the merits of this argument, the generic company was forced to make a
Paragraph IV certification, allowing the pioneer company to sue the
ANDA applicant and delay generic competition for up to thirty months. 67
A sham patent could even be filed after a generic challenger has filed a
Paragraph I, II, or III certification, forcing the generic to file a revised
68
ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification. Used this way,
the Orange Book can be a strategic weapon ...giving the patent/NDA
holder almost automatic injunctive relief for even marginal
infringement claims. Adding to a patentee/NDA holder's advantage is
FDA's long-standing policy of avoiding patent disputes, as evidenced
by its willingness to list in the Orange Book virtually any patent
submitted by an NDA holder and its refusal to hear any challenge to
the adequac or completeness of a generic applicant's Paragraph IV
certification.
Furthermore, the patent holder could obtain multiple thirty-month stays
by submitting new sham patents over time, thereby delaying generic
competition for several years." This loophole was harshly criticized
because, "[b]y the time the litigation plays out, even if the generic
company prevails, enough time has gone by for the pioneer company to
realize substantial continued profits on its drug product, perhaps far
above its costs of litigation against the generic competitor.""
Additionally, if the pioneer's patent expires before the first generic
challenger receives final ANDA approval, the challenger must amend its
with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, which is published monthly. OFFICE OF GENERIC DRUGS,
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS

(2oo8) [hereinafter Orange Book], available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/ob/docs/preface/ecpreface.htm.
The FDCA requires a patent holder to include in its NDA

the patent number and the expiration date of any patent which claims the drug for which
the applicant submitted the application or which claims a method of using such drug and
with respect to which a claim of patent infringement could reasonably be asserted if a
person not licensed by the owner engaged in the manufacture, use, or sale of the drug.
21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(i). The patent numbers and expiration dates are then published in the Orange
Book. Process patents and certain composition of matter patents are precluded from being listed in the
Orange Book, though generic manufacturers may still be sued for infringing these unlisted patents. See
infra notes 99, 18s and accompanying text.
66. Brian Porter, Comment, Stopping the Practiceof Authorized Generics: Mylan's Effort to Close
the Gaping Black Hole in the Hatch-Waxman Act, 22 J. CoNTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 177, s81 (2005).
67. Soehnge, supra note 23, at 71-72.

68. See, e.g., Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323, 1330-31 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
69. Terry G. Mahn, Patenting Drug Products: Anticipating Hatch-Waxman Issues During the
Claims Drafting Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 245, 250 (1999) (citing 59 Fed. Reg. 50,345 (Oct. 3,
1994)).
70. See Soehnge, supra note 23, at 72.
71. Id. (citing Glasgow, supranote 63).
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certification from a Paragraph IV to a Paragraph II, and will no longer be
entitled to the 180-day exclusivity upon ANDA approval.72
Consequently, generic challengers facing multiple thirty-month stays
risked wasting millions of dollars in litigation and losing the benefit of
exclusive marketing if they failed to resolve litigation before the
pioneer's patent expired.73
C.

REVERSE PAYMENTS AND 180-DAY EXCLUSIVITY BOTTLENECKS

As discussed above, the first generic manufacturer to file a
Paragraph IV ANDA is entitled to 18o days of market exclusivity once it
enters the market.74 Until the exclusivity period runs, the FDA is barred
from approving ANDAs by later-filing applicants.75 But patent holders
have been able to manipulate the trigger of the exclusivity period, and
thereby delay the entry of generic competitors indefinitely. 6 In litigation
related to a Paragraph IV certification, the parties can settle so that the
first filer agrees to delay marketing its generic equivalent until a later
date (often till right before the patent expires).77 Since the first filer never
enters the market, the 180-day exclusivity period does not run and
generic entry becomes bottlenecked because the FDA cannot approve
later-filed ANDAs. 8
These settlements often involve so-called "reverse payments," which
are cash payments by the patent holder to the generic challenger.79 Such
payments effectively allow pioneers to avoid competition by sharing their
monopoly profits with generic challengers. Surprisingly, reverse
payments are generally not found to violate antitrust laws, despite their
anticompetitive effect of excluding or delaying entry of generics." This is
especially ironic since the patent holder is able to avoid competition even
though the challenged patent would likely have been either invalidated
72. See 21 U.S.C. § 3 55 (J)(5)(D)(i)(VI) (2oo6). Recall that ANDAs for expired pioneer patents
require Paragraph II certifications. Id. § 3 55 (J)(2)(A)(vii)(II); see also supra note 38 and accompanying
text.
73. See, e.g., Dr. Reddy's Labs., Inc. v. Thompson, 302 F. Supp. 2d 340, 350-57 (D.N.J. 2003). One

practioner suggests that this structure encourages earlier challenges to drug patents, which advances
the public's interest in invalidating weak patents, and that generic manufacturer can avoid this risk by
submitting ANDAs earlier. E-mail from Dr. Michael Shuster, Partner, Fenwick & West LLP, to
Author (Mar. 23, 2oo8, 18:00:40 PST) (on file with author).

74. 2t U.S.C. § 355(J)(5)(B)(iv); see also supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
75. 21 U.S.C. § 3550)(5)(B)(iv)76. See Soehnge, supra note 23, at 74.
77- Id.
78. See id.
79. See, e.g., In re Buspirone Patent Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 363, 365-67 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
Commentators refer to such settlements as "reverse payments" because they involve payments from
the plaintiff to the defendant-i.e., from the patentee to the generic manufacturer. See James C.
,
Burling, Hatch-Waxman PatentSettlements: The Battle for a Benchmark. 20 ANTITUST 41 41 (2006).
For further
of
this
Note.
the
scope
violations
are
outside
8o. Id. Discussions of antitrust
discussion, see generally Fazzio, supra note 17, and Hemphill, supra note 17.
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by a court or found not to cover the generic product. 8' "Pay-for-delay"
settlements are arguably an abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act because
they inhibit competition by generic manufacturers.2 Indeed, Senator
Orrin Hatch, coauthor of the Act, has condemned such settlements,
stating that he "find[s! these types of reverse payment collusive
arrangements appalling." '
D.

"AUTHORIZED" GENERIC COMPETITION DURING THE EXCLUSIVITY
PERIOD

Alternatively, when faced with a generic challenge, the NDA/patent
holder can license another party to use its NDA to manufacture so-called
"authorized generics."8 4 An authorized generic drug is manufactured by
the NDA holder, but distributed through a licensee, who packages the
drug with its own label and FDA identification number."' Therefore, the
authorized generic drug is the same drug the brand-name pharmaceutical
sells, simply repackaged, marketed as a generic, and sold at a lower price.
Because the 18o-day exclusivity period only bars ANDA applicants, the
authorized generic manufacturer can market its drug during this period.
Consequently, when a Paragraph IV ANDA applicant prevails in
infringement litigation, it immediately faces competition from the
authorized generic manufacturer, effectively nullifying the benefit of the
18o-day exclusivitZ period and severely cutting into the ANDA
applicant's profits. Adding insult to injury, the patent holder recoups
81. See Paying off Hearing,supra note 5,at 131-32 (statement of Comm'r Jon Leibowitz, Federal

Trade Commission). According to the FTC, generic challengers prevail 73% of the time in litigation
filed pursuant to Paragraph IV ANDAs. FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 39, at 13.
82. See 148 CONG. REC. S7565 -66 (daily ed. July 30, 2002) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (asserting
that pay-for-delay settlements were an unanticipated outcome of the Hatch-Waxman Act); see also S.
REP. No. Io7-I67, at 4 (2002) ("Agreeing with smaller rivals to delay or limit competition is an abuse
of the Hatch-Waxman law ....). But see Burling, supra note 79, at 44 (arguing in support of reverse
payments as a valid form of risk aversion by patent holders).
83. 148 CONG.REc. S7 566 (daily ed. July 30, 2002) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
84. The FDA has defined "authorized generic" as "any marketing by an NDA holder or
authorized by an NDA holder, including through a third-party distributor, of the drug product
approved under the NDA in a manner equivalent to the marketing practices of holders of an approved
ANDA for that drug." Letter from William K. Hubbard, Assoc. Comm'r for Policy and Planning,
Food & Drug Admin., to Stuart A. Williams, Chief Legal Officer, Mylan Pharm., Inc., and James N.
Czaban, Heller Ehrman LLP (July 2, 2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/
o4/julyo4/o7o7o4/o4p-oo75-pdnoooi.pdf.
85. See id.
86. The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) sponsored a study
looking at the effect of authorized generics on drug prices. IMS CONSULING, IMS HEALTH,
ASSESSMENT

OF

AUTHORIZED

GENERICS

IN

THE

U.S. (2006),

available at http://www.phrma.org/

filesfIMS%2oAuthorized%2oGenerics%2oReport_6-22-o6.pdf. The study compared drugs where an
authorized generic was launched during the first ANDA applicant's igo-day exclusivity period, with
drugs where no authorized generic was marketed during the exclusivity period. See id. at 6-7. The
effect of the authorized generics on drug prices was evaluated by comparing the price difference
between generic and branded drugs in both cases. Id. at 7. The study found that where no authorized
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some of its losses via licensing fees from the authorized generic
manufacturer. The authorized generic scenario is illustrated by Johnson
& Johnson's (J&J) licensing of the drug Ortho-Tricyclen to Watson
Pharmaceuticals in the face of a Paragraph IV challenge by the generic
manufacturer Barr Pharmaceuticals:
Barr, a unit of Barr Pharmaceuticals Inc., had spent five years working
on copying Ortho-Tricyclen, the most widely prescribed oral
contraceptive, and challenging J&J's patents on the drug in court.
But when Barr launched its product Dec. 29, [2003,] it wasn't alone.
A competitor, Watson Pharmaceuticals Inc., had cut a deal with J&J to
put out an authorized copy of Ortho-Tricyclen, agreeing to share some
of its revenue from the drug. The authorized generic drove down prices
and cut into sales of the Barr drug, costing it hundreds of millions of
dollars. s
Generic companies argue that the use of authorized generics by
patent holders impedes competition by reducing the monetary incentive
for generic companies to challenge the pioneer company's patents via the
ANDA process. 88 In the long term, this disincentivizing could result in
fewer generic companies challenging patents via Paragraph IV
certifications."' Ironically, authorized generics are pro-competitive from
the consumer's perspective, since they increase the number of
competitors in the market more quickly. The FDA agrees, stating that
"marketing of authorized generics increases competition, promoting
lower prices for drugs, particularly during the I80-day exclusivity period
in which the prices for generic drugs are often substantially higher than
after other generic products are able to enter the market."' However,
while authorized generics may increase short-term competition, it is
possible that they will decrease competition in the long term by deterring
Paragraph IV challenges.9

generic was marketed during the exclusivity period, the generic drug sold for 23% less than the
branded drug. See id. at Io. But where an authorized generic was marketed during the exclusivity
period, the discount between generics and the branded drug increased to 38%. See id. at 9. In contrast,
the Generic Pharmaceutical Association (GPhA) sponsored an identical study, which found that
authorized generics had almost no effect on generic drug prices during the exclusivity period. See
AIDAN

HOLLIS

& BRIAN

LIANG,

AN

ASSESSMENT

OF THE

EFFECT

OF AUTHORIZED

GENERICS

ON

18 (2oo6), available at http://www.gphaonline.org/AM/Template.cfin?Section=
Home&Template=/CMContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD 2647.
87. Abboud, supra note 55.
88. Agency Views on Authorized Generics a Boon to Brands, WASH. DRUG LETTER, Oct. tI, 2004,
CONSUMER

PRICES

at 9.
89. Id.
9o. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
91. See Petition from Mylan Pharm., Inc. to Food & Drug Admin., Citizen Petition No. 200 4 Poo75, at 2 [hereinafter Mylan Pharm. Petition] (Feb. 17, 2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/
dockets/dailys/o4/febo4/o218o4/o4p-oo75-cpoooo I-volI.pdf.
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REVISIONS TO THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT IN 2003

THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND
MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003

In response to the antitrust litigation spawned by the loopholes
described above, the FTC initiated a study to examine whether the
Hatch-Waxman i8o-day market exclusivity and thirty-month stay
provisions facilitated anticompetitive behavior. 92 The FTC released its
report in July 2002 with two major recommended amendments to the
Hatch-Waxman Act: (i) that the FDA should allow only one thirtymonth stay per ANDA application; and (2) that pioneer drug companies
provide agreements relating to the manufacture, marketing, or sale of a
generic drug, or to the 180-day market exclusivity to the FTC and the
Department of Justice. 93
Responding to the FTC study and pressure from the executive
branch,94 in 2003 Congress amended the FDCA by enacting the Medicare
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act (Medicare
Modernization Act or "MMA") in order to, inter alia, curb the abuses
described above.95
B.

(MMA SECTION I IOI)
Under the Medicare Modernization Act, when the pioneer sues a
generic challenger in response to a Paragraph IV ANDA, the pioneer
cannot obtain more than one thirty-month stay of approval of the
ANDA.9 6 Congress reasoned that a single thirty-month stay should not
cause significant delay in generic market entry because the stay runs
concurrently with FDA approval of the ANDA, which generally takes
eighteen to twenty-five months.97
The revised statute also limits abuse of the thirty-month stay caused
by filing "sham" patents. Generic challengers now only need to certify to
patents that were listed in the Orange Book at the time their ANDA was
filed. 9 This means that generic challengers no longer need to modify
LIMITING USE OF THE THIRTY-MONTH STAY

92. FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 39, at i.
93. Id. at ii-viii.
94. See President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President on Prescription Drugs (Oct. 21,
2002) (proposing new FDA regulations to expedite generic drug approvals), available at http:/l
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2oo2/Io/2oo21o2 I-2.html.
95. Pub. L. No. iO8-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (effective Dec. 8, 2003) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 21 and 42 U.S.C.).
96. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 383 F. Supp. 2d 686, 691 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 2004); see
also 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C) (2006).
97. Press Release, Sen. Judd Gregg, Breakthrough, Bipartisan Legislation to Make More
Prescription Drugs Affordable, Available Gets Boost (Jun. 1I, 2003), available at http://
www.senate.gov/-gregg/press/2003/presso6i 103.pdf.
98. Medicare Modernization Act, § 1102(a)(2)(A) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§ 3550)(5)(B)(iii) (2006)); see also Barry J. Marenberg, Changes to the Hatch-Waxman Act Following
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their ANDA in response to later filed patents. Furthermore, the FDA
also revised its regulations to address this abuse, and now limits the types
of patents that can be listed in the Orange Book, specifically precluding
the listing of patents claiming metabolites, intermediates, or packaging
features.99
C.

(MMA SECTION 1102)
Under the terms of the 2003 amendments, the 18o-day exclusivity
period commences when the first ANDA applicant begins commercial
marketing of either its own generic version of the listed drug or an
"authorized" private label version of the drug."' This amendment
codified a 2001 district court decision holding that the "commercial
marketing" trigger for the i8o-day exclusivity period begins when the
first-filing Paragraph IV ANDA applicant begins selling either its own
generic equivalent of the pioneer's drug or a private label version of the
product."' Therefore, if an ANDA applicant enters into a settlement
agreement with the patent holder to become an authorized generic
manufacturer under the pioneer's NDA, its actions trigger the r8o-day
exclusivity period. This amendment prevents the pioneer from stopping
further generic competition by keeping the first-filing generic
manufacturer from selling the drug under the pioneer's NDA.
Congress also added new provisions whereby the first Paragraph IV
ANDA applicant will forfeit its rights to the I8o-day exclusivity period if
a specified "forfeiture event" occurs."' Certain forfeiture events were
specifically designed to force generic manufacturers to promptly enter
the market upon approval of the ANDA application, and to prevent the
pioneer from stopping generic competition by paying the first-filing
ANDA applicant to delay the launch of their generic drug." These
complex "failure to market" provisions stipulate that the first generic
FORFEITURE OF

180-DAY

EXCLUSIVITY

the "MedicarePrescriptionDrug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2oo3," 23 BioTEcH. L. REP.
277, 277 (2004).
99. 21 C.F.R. § 314. 53 (b)(I) (effective Aug. 19, 2003).

o0. 21 U.S.C. § 355(J)(5)(B)(iv)(I) (2006). The revised Act now provides that,
[i]f the [ANDA] contains a [Paragraph IV] certification... and is for a drug for which a first
applicant has submitted an application containing such a certification, the application shall
be made effective on the date that is one hundred and eighty days after the date of the first
commercial marketing of the drug (including the commercial marketing of the listed drug)
by any first applicant.
Id. Unlike the pre-MMA version of the Act, a court decision does not by itself start the i8o-day
period. Cf. 21 U.S.C. § 355(J)(5)(B)(iv)(II) (2ooo) (amended 2003) (permitting trigger of the 18o-day
period by "a decision of a court.., holding the patent which is the subject of the certification to be
invalid or not infringed").
ioi. Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 207 F. Supp. 2d 476, 488 (N.D.W. Va. 2ooi); see also Erika
King Lietzan, A Brief History of 18o-Day Exclusivity Under the Hatch-Waxman Amendments to the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 59 FooD &DRUG L.J. 287, 304 (2004).
102. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(J)(5)(D) (2006).
103. A detailed presentation and analysis of these provisions is given in Part IV.B, infra.
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challenger will forfeit the 18o-day exclusivity period if it fails to market
the generic version of the pioneer drug by the later of: (I) seventy-five
days after the ANDA is approved, or thirty months after the ANDA was
filed, whichever is earlier; or (2) seventy-five days after one of the
following has occurred: (i) the Federal Circuit holds that the pioneer's
patent either invalid or not infringed, (ii) a district court approves a
settlement agreement that includes a finding that the pioneer's patent
either invalid or not infringed, or (iii) the NDA/patent holder withdraws
its patent information from the OrangeBook.' 4
The MMA also created the following miscellaneous forfeiture
events: (i) the first ANDA applicant withdraws its application, (2) the
first applicant withdraws its Paragraph IV certification by amending it to
another certification (e.g., a Paragraph I through III certification), (3) the
first applicant fails to obtain "tentative approval" of its ANDA within
thirty months of filing, (4) the first applicant enters into an agreement
with either the NDA/patent holder or another generic challenger that
either the FTC or a court finds to be in violation of federal antitrust laws,
or (5) all the patents related to the Paragraph IV certification(s) have
expired. 5
If the first applicant forfeits its 180-day exclusivity, any later-filed
ANDAs may be approved and made effective immediately. °6 In all
forfeiture cases, the 180-day exclusivity never applies to subsequent
ANDA applicants."°
D.

OTHER REVISIONS

A generic manufacturer that is sued for patent infringement in
response to a Paragraph IV ANDA filing may now bring a counterclaim
to delist the patent from the Orange Book.""s If the pioneer's patent is
found either to not cover the listed drug or to cover only an invalid
method of using the listed drug, the pioneer can be forced to withdraw
the patent listing from the Orange Book, allowing the generic challenger
to amend its application to a Paragraph I certification and thereby avoid
litigation."

104. 21 U.S.C. § 355(J)(5)(D)(i)(I).
105. Id. § 3 5 5(J)(5)(D)(i)(II)-(VI).

iO6. Id. § 355(J)(5)(D)(iii)(1).
107. Id. § 355(J)(5)(D)(iii)(II).
io8. Id. § 3 5 5 (J)( 5 )(C)(ii) ("If an owner of the [patent holder] brings a patent infringement action
against the [ANDA] applicant, the applicant may assert a counterclaim seeking an order requiring the
holder to correct or delete the patent information submitted by the holder.., on the ground that the
patent does not claim either-(aa) the drug for which the application was approved; or (bb) an
approved method of using the drug."). Note that this is not an independent cause of action and can
only be raised as a counterclaim.
to9. Id. It is beyond the scope of this Note to provide a full analysis of this provision. But it seems
unlikely that the first ANDA applicant would ever file such a counterclaim, since they would either (i)
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Also, where the NDA/patent holder does not bring an infringement
action within forty-five days of receiving notice of the Paragraph IV
certification, the ANDA applicant may bring a "[c]ivil action to obtain
patent certainty .....
In this case, the ANDA applicant may seek a
declaratory judgment that the patent at issue is invalid or will not be
infringed by the drug for which the applicant seeks approval."' In
exchange, the ANDA applicant must offer the NDA-holder confidential
access to its application so it can determine whether there is possible
infringement."'
In an attempt to thwart possible anticompetitive settlements
between pioneers and generic challengers, section I12 of the MMA
provides that certain types of agreements must be filed with both the
FTC and the Department of Justice." 3 Where the settlement is between a
patent holder and a Paragraph IV ANDA applicant, it must be reported
to the antitrust agencies if it relates to either: (i) the "manufacture,
marketing or sale" of the patented drug or its generic equivalent; or (2)
the 180-day exclusivity period for that drug."4 If the settlement is
between two Paragraph IV ANDA challengers, it only needs to be
reported if it relates to the 180-day exclusivity period for the drug they
are challenging." 5 The purpose of these reporting requirements was to
deter anticompetitive agreements by giving the antitrust agencies "access
to information about secret deals between drug companies that keep
generic drugs off the market.""..6

forfeit the exclusivity period by amending to a Paragraph I certification, or (2) trigger a forfeiture
event. Exercising this counterclaim option would only be useful for later-filing applicants, who could
possibly deprive the first filer of the exclusivity period by forcing the NDA holder to delist their patent
from the Orange Book.
Ito. Medicare Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. io8-173, 117 Stat. 2066, § iioi(a), (d) (effective
Dec. 8, 2003) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 3550)(5)(C) (2006), 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(5) (2006)).
iii. 21 U.S.C. § 355(J)(5)(C)(i); 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(5). Despite Congress' explicit attempt to grant
generic challengers declaratory judgment jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit held that such actions failed
to meet the Constitution's Article III "case or controversy" requirement. See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc.
v. Pfizer, Inc., 395 F.3 d 1324, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2005). But after the Supreme Court's decision in
MedImmune v. Genentech, 127 S.Ct. 764 (2007), the Federal Circuit revised its position and now
allows generic challengers to bring declaratory judgment actions even when the patent holder has
granted the generic a covenant not to sue. See Caraco Pharm. Labs. v. Forest Labs, 527 F.3 d 1278,
1290-91 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Teva Pharm. USA v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1340 (Fed. Cir.
2007). But recent cases suggest that declaratory judgment actions brought by later-filing ANDA
applicants may fail the "case or controversy" requirement. See Janssen Pharm. v. Apotex, Inc., No.
20o8-io62, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 18822 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 4, 2008); Merck & Co. v. Apotex, Inc., No.
2007-1362, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 15014 (Fed. Cir. July 16, 20o8).
112. 21 U.S.C. § 3 55(J)(5)(C)(i)(III).
113. Medicare Modernization Act § 112 (effective Dec. 8, 2003) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 nt.).
s14. Id. § iii2(a).
115. Id.§ III2(b).
I16. 148 CONG. REC. Si1 3 4o (daily ed. Nov. 18, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
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IMPACT OF THE MEDICARE MODERNIZATION ACT ON ABUSE OF THE

HATCH-WAXMAN ACT

The 2003 amendments attempted to address many of the abuses
previously described. When the MMA was approved, Senator Bill Frist
stated that the bill took "steps to reduce or eliminate the delays in the
movement of generic drugs to the marketplace,""..7 and Senator Charles
Schumer stated that the revisions were designed to ensure that the 18oday exclusivity period "cannot be used as a bottleneck" to generic drug
entry. " ' The amendments were very effective in closing some loopholes,
have proven ineffective in closing others, and failed to address some
abuses altogether. Additionally, the amended statutory language has
spawned a host of new interpretative questions for patent holders to
manipulate.
A.

MULTIPLE THIRTY-MONTH STAYS BARRED

Among all of the amendments under the Medicare Modernization
Act, the revisions targeting abuse of the thirty-month stay have been the
most effective. By only requiring ANDA applicants to certify to patents
listed in the Orange Book at the time of filing and limiting the patent
holder to only one thirty-month stay, the MMA has eliminated the
patent holder's practice of gaining multiple stays to keep generic
challengers off the market. "9
While the major abuse of the thirty-month stay has been resolved,
some minor problems remain unaddressed. First, the duration of the
thirty-month stay is arbitrary. Originally, the proposed duration of the
stay was eighteen months, but it was increased to thirty months due to
the lobbying efforts of the pharmaceutical industry. 2 ' Because the
average ANDA takes only 25.5 months to get approved, the typical
applicant is kept off the market for several months while waiting for the
thirty-month stay to expire.'2 '
Second, the MMA failed to address the problem created when the
pioneer's patent expires before the FDA approves the first filer's
Paragraph IV ANDA. If the generic challenger cannot get final ANDA
approval before the patent expires, it will be forced to amend its ANDA
from a Paragraph IV to a Paragraph II certification, thereby forfeiting its
right to the I8o-day exclusivity period.'" Consequently, the generic
challenger will have little incentive to bring a Paragraph IV challenge if
117. 149 CONG. REc. S15761 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 2003) (statement of Sen. Frist).
118. Id. at S15746 (statement of Sen. Schumer).
119. Marenberg, supra note 98, at 277.
120. Gerald J.Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug
Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 190 (1999).
121. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supranote 39, at iii.

122. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(J)(5)(D)(i)(III) (2oo6).
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the patent is set to expire within thirty months. For example, a generic
challenger could file a Paragraph IV ANDA twenty-eight months before
the pioneer's patent expires. The FDA could then tentatively approve
the ANDA after eighteen months. But because of the thirty-month stay,
the generic challenger will be unable to get final approval before the
patent expires.'2 3 Once the patent expires, it will be forced to forfeit the
exclusivity period by amending its ANDA to a Paragraph II certification.
In these situations, a generic challenger risks expensive litigation where,
even if it would likely succeed on the merits, it might lose the benefit of
marketing exclusivity due to lengthy litigation.
Because the thirty-month stay effectively functions like an injunction
against the generic manufacturer, preventing it from possibly infringing
the pioneer's patent,'24 one solution would be to stay ANDA approval
until there is a court decision or a settlement. But this scheme would be
problematic where the patent holder purposefully draws out the
litigation. If the generic challenger has a particularly strong case, it may
want to launch "at-risk" as soon as the ANDA is approved, despite the
fact that litigation is still pending.' 5 Therefore, an alternate solution
would be to eliminate the thirty-month stay altogether and to allow the
market to run its course. This would allow a generic challenger to enter
the market as soon as the ANDA is approved, even though litigation is
still pending, and if the pioneer prevails in litigation, the generic would
simply be liable for damages.26 Pioneers would naturally object to the
latter solution, since the damages they could recover if they prevailed in
litigation may not compensate them for the profits lost due to early
generic competition.' Consequently, the thirty-month stay may be the
best compromise between these two extreme alternatives.
B.

REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS

i.
Post-MMA Litigation Splits on Legality of Reverse Payments
While the Medicare Modernization Act attempted to address the
negative effects of pay-for-delay settlements-e.g., through the
exclusivity forfeiture provisions-it did not expressly bar reverse
payments by patent holders to generic challengers to delay market entry.
Instead, the MMA simply requires that drug companies report certain
123. This example also assumes that the generic challenger could not conclude litigation before the
patent expires.
124. Caffrey & Rotter, supra note ii, at 23.
125. Yana Pechersky, Note, To Achieve Closure of the Hatch-Waxman Act's Loopholes, Legislative
Action Is Unnecessary: Generic ManufacturersAre Able to Hold Their Own, 25 CARDozo ARTS &ENT.
L.J. 775, 796 (2O07). Marketing a generic drug while related Paragraph IV litigation is pending is

considered "at-risk" because the generic challenger risks liability for the pioneer's lost profits if the
generic loses the patent case. See id.
126. Caffrey & Rotter, supra note I t, at 23.
127. Id. at 43.
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types of settlement agreements to both the FTC and the Department of
Justice."'
At the time the MMA filing requirement went into effect, the FTC
had investigated and brought several enforcement actions based on the
theory that a payment from a brand firm to a generic company, in the
context of a patent settlement, had likely anticompetitive effects where
the payment caused a delay of the generic's entry into the market. As a
consequence, Congress likely perceived that the FTC possessed
sufficient legal authority to continue challenging potentially
anticompetitive pharmaceutical settlements, and thereby simply
required parties to provide notice of such settlements. 9

But Congress incorrectly assumed that the FTC would be able to stop
pay-for-delay settlements. This harmful practice has proceeded unabated
in light of a split among the federal circuit courts of appeals on whether
such payments are antitrust violations.'30 Three circuits have allowed payfor-delay settlements absent direct evidence of patent invalidity or
infringement, 3 ' while other circuits have deemed such settlements per se
illegal. 3 2 In light of these decisions, the general rule seems to be that for a
reverse payment to be found legal, its terms must stay within the scope of
the patent-that is, the reverse payment settlement must not extend the
patent holder's monopoly beyond the normal patent term. 3 ' Currently,
the FTC appears to be bringing cases in an effort to create a split among
the circuits and thereby force review by the United States Supreme
Court. "'
128. Medicare Modernization Act, Pub. L. No.
2003) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 nt. (2oo6)).
129. Seth Silber & Matthew Bye, Is That
Pharmaceutical Settlement Agreements, ANTITRUST
omitted).
130. See BUREAU OF COMPETITION, FED. TRADE

lO8-173, 117 Stat. 2o66, § 1112 (effective Dec. 8,

Everything? Antitrust Filing Obligations for
COMPLIANCE BULL., Mar. 20o8, at 39 (footnote
COMM'N, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FEDERAL

TRADE COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION

ACT OF 2003: SUMMARY OF AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2007 at 2 (2008) (finding that 42% of settlement
agreements between pioneers and generic manufacturers during fiscal year 2007 included some form
of reverse payment).
131. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, No. 2oo8-IO97 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 15,
2008); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2oo6), cert. denied sub nom.
Joblove v. Barr Labs, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 3001 (2007); Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3 d 1056, 1076
(llth Cir. 2oo5), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 919 (2006); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d
1294, 1304, 1312-13 (I ith Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 939 (2004).
132. See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 9o8 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. denied sub
nom. Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Kroger Co., 543 U.S. 939 (2004); Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int'l,
256 F-3d 799, 8o9-12 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (dicta), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 931 (2002).
133. Pechersky, supra note 125, at 795.
134. For example, the FTC recently filed suit in the D.C. District Court against Cephalon for
entering into pay-for-delay settlements with four ANDA applicants. See Complaint for Injunctive
Relief at 9, FTC v. Cephalon, Inc., No. I:o8-Cv-0o244 (D.D.C. Feb. 13, 2o08). Review of any decisions
from this court would go to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, which is considered a sophisticated
antitrust court, and possibly cause a split with the decisions of the Second and Eleventh Circuits.
Client Alert, Seth Silber, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati PC, FTC Sues Cephalon for "Reverse
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Settlements Where the ChallengerRetains i8o-Day Exclusivity

The MMA attempted to address situations where pay-for-delay
settlements "bottleneck" generic competition because the first ANDA
applicant receives 18o-day market exclusivity but never enters the
market.'35 The revised Act provides that exclusivity is forfeited if the first
applicant does not enter the market within "75 days after the date on
which the approval of the application of the first applicant is made
effective."' However, in practice, where a settlement occurs and the first
applicant does not enter the market, the 180-day exclusivity has not been
forfeited due to a loophole found when interpreting the forfeiture
provisions. 37
In a typical pay-for-delay settlement, the first filer receives ANDA
approval, but agrees not to enter the market for several years, and the
settlement does not include a finding that the pioneer's patent is invalid
or not infringed. In such a case, later-filing applicants will not be able to
enter the market until the first filer expends or forfeits the exclusivity
period. The forfeiture provisions state that the first filer's 180-day
exclusivity is lost if, inter alia, there is a "failure to market" event." 8 The
Act defines "failure to market" as follows:
(I) FAILURE TO MARKET. The first applicant fails to market the
drug by the later of-

(aa) the earlierof the date that is(AA) 75 days after the date on which the [application of the
first applicant is approved]; or
(BR) 30 months after the date of submission of the
application of the first applicant; or
(bb) with respect to the first applicant or any other applicant
(which other applicant has received tentative approval), the date
that is 75 days after the date as of which.., at least i of the
following has occurred:
(AA) In an infringement action ...or in a declaratory

judgment action... [the Federal Circuit finds on appeal] that
the patent is invalid or not infringed.
(BB) In an infringement action or a declaratory judgment
action.., a court signs a settlement order or consent decree
that enters a final judgment that includes a finding that the
patent is invalid or not infringed.
Payment" Patent Settlements with Four Generic Pharmaceutical Firms 4 (Feb. 19, 2008), available at
http://www.wsgr.com/publications/pdfsearch/clientalert-cephalon.pdf.
135. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(J)(5)(D) (2006).
136. Id. § 355()(5)(D)(i)(I)(aa)(AA).
137. E-mail from Seth Silber, Of Counsel, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati PC, to Author (Feb.
22, 2008, o6:58:04 PST) (on file with author).
138. 21 U.S.C. § 355(J)(5)(D)(i)-(ii).

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 6o:171

(CC) [The patent holder delists the patent from the Orange
Book]. 39

Interpreting the failure to market provisions requires a series of "earlier
of"/"later of" analyses. 40 The FDA must look to the later of the dates
determined by applying subparts (aa) and (bb). In the typical scenario,
the first filer will already have its ANDA approved by the time they
enter a settlement with the patent holder. Therefore, under subpart (aa),
the "earlier of" date is typically seventy-five days after the FDA
approved the ANDA. Next, subpart (bb) requires the FDA to determine
if any of three scenarios has occurred. But in a typical reverse payment
settlement, none of the events will have happened yet-there will be no
court finding that the relevant patent is invalid or not infringed, and the
patent will remain listed in the Orange Book. On January 17, 2008, the

FDA explained its interpretation of the forfeiture provisions:
We find that under the plain language of the statute, 18o-day
exclusivity is not forfeited for failure to market when an event under
subpart (aa) has occurred, but-as in this case-none of the events in
subpart (bb) has occurred. The "failure to market" provision results in
forfeiture when there are two dates on the basis of which FDA may
identify the "later" event as described in section 505(J)(5)(D)(i)(I).
The provision does not effect a forfeiture when an event under subpart
(aa) has occurred, but no event under subpart (bb) has yet occurred.'4'
Therefore, the problem is that even if an event in subpart (aa) has
happened, it is impossible to determine the "later of" event since any of
the events listed in subpart (bb) could happen in the future.'42 It is
possible that pending or future litigation would lead to a finding of
invalidity or noninfringement, or that the NDA holder might one day
delist the patent. But it is impossible for the FDA to determine whether
any of these events will or will not ever happen.
For example, event (bb)(AA) could feasibly occur if a later-filing
ANDA applicant brings a declaratory judgment action against the patent
holder to demonstrate that the pioneer's patent is invalid or not
infringed.'43 But it is unlikely that a later filer would ever initiate such
139. Id. § 355(J)(5)(D)(i)(1) (emphasis added).
140. Letter from Gary J. Buehler, Dir., Office of Generic Drugs, Ctr. for Drug Evaluation and
Research, to Marc A. Goshko, Executive Dir., Teva N. Am. 4 [hereinafter Buehler Letter] (Jan. 17,
2oo8), availableat www.fda.gov/ohrmslDOCKETSIDOCKETS/o7no3891o7n-o389-letooo3.pdf.
141. Id. at 5.
142. Id.
143. Ironically, in light of Janssen v. Apotex, No. 2oo8-Io62, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 18822 (Fed.
Cir. Sept. 4, 2008), later-filing ANDA applicants are probably unable to bring declaratory judgment
actions because they cannot satisfy the Article III "case or controversy" requirement. See discussion
supra note i i i. Alternatively, in response to a later-filed ANDA application, the patent holder could
sue the later-filer under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A), initiating litigation that could lead to a finding of
invalidity or noninfringement. But this is also unlikely since the pioneer loses nothing by effectively
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litigation, because, even if the later filer prevailed in court, it would not
be entitled to the I80-day exclusivity. Since the exclusivity period is
solely held by the first filer and does not "roll over" to later filers, even
when forfeited by the first filer, there is no incentive for later filers to
bear the cost of litigation. The FDA commented in a footnote that:
Inherent in the structure of the "failure to market" forfeiture
provisions is the possibility that a first applicant would be able to enter
into a settlement agreement with the NDA holder or patent owner in
which a court does not enter a final judgment of invalidity or noninfringement (i.e., without a forfeiture event under subpart (bb)
occurring), and that subsequent applicants would be unable to initiate
a forfeiture with a declaratory judgment action. This inability to force a
forfeiture of 180-day exclusivity could result in delays in the approval
of otherwise approvable ANDAs owned by applicants that would
market their generic drugs if they could but obtain approval. This
potential scenario is not one for which the statute currently provides a
remedy.'"
Consequently, the FDA's interpretation of the MMA forfeiture
provisions means that the first filer will almost never forfeit the
exclusivity period in either reverse payment situations or otherwise. The
FDA has not yet drafted regulations covering the new forfeiture
provisions of the MMA and continues to resolve these issues on a caseby-case basis.'45 If the FDA fails to promulgate such regulations, it is
likely that the interpretative questions surrounding the forfeiture
provisions will be resolved by the courts in future litigation. 46 Until then,
the problem remains that "the 180-day exclusivity, which Congress
created to reward generics for entering early, does precisely the opposite:
it extends the brand's monopoly, forcing consumers to pay excessive
prices for [drugs] throughout the span of these illegal deals."' 47
3. Settlements Where the ChallengerWithdraws Its ANDA
The reverse payment problem is exacerbated by the fact that only
the first ANDA applicant can take advantage of the i80-day
settlement. 48 Even if the first applicant withdraws its ANDA, the
ignoring the later-filing. Even if the later-filer's ANDA is approved, it will be prevented from entering
the market because of the bottleneck caused by the pioneer's pay-for-delay settlement with the first
filer.
144. Buehler Letter, supra note 140, at 5 n.6.

145. Id. at i.
146. FDA Solicits Public Comment on Yet Another 18o-Day Generic Drug Exclusivity Issue,
FDA Law Blog, http://www.fdalawblog.net/ (Oct. 12, 2007, 10:48 EST).
147. Statement of Jon Leibowitz, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Concurring in Part and
Dissenting in Part in the Matter of Cephalon, Inc. 2 (Feb. 13, 2oo8), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
os/caselist/o61oi82/o8O2l3comment.pdf.
148. The Hatch-Waxman Act provides that if "a previous application has been submitted," a
subsequent ANDA filer must wait until 18o days after the "first commercial marketing of the drug
under the previous application" or a favorable court decision, whichever is earlier. 21 U.S.C.
355(J)(5)(B)(iv) (2oo6). FDA regulations have interpreted this language to mean that the only
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exclusivity period will never apply to later-filing applicants.'49
Consequently, if the first applicant settles and withdraws its ANDA,
there is no incentive for another generic company to make a Paragraph
IV filing because, even if they succeed in patent litigation, they will fail to
gain market exclusivity. 5 ° This problem of penalizing meritorious second
filers could be fixed by creating a "rolling exclusivity" procedure. The
Hatch-Waxman Act should be revised so that if the first Paragraph IV
challenger settles and does not enter the market, the i8o-day exclusivity
would instead be granted to the next challenger.'5 ' Granting the
exclusivity period to the first successful generic challenger would simplify
the Act and deter reverse payment settlements since it would be less
feasible for the patent holder to enter such settlements with multiple
generic challengers.
4. Banning Reverse Payments
As discussed above, despite the Medicare Modernization Act
amendments, pay-for-delay settlements continue to inhibit generic
competition. One solution to the reverse payment problem would be to
completely prohibit any type of settlement between ANDA applicants
and patent holders in Paragraph IV infringement litigation. This theory
holds that "there should be a duty either to litigate such suits to a
judgment of infringement/noninfringement or validity/invalidity or to
dismiss them.'. 5 2 A more narrowly tailored solution would be to allow
settlements, but to create an absolute ban on reverse payments as part of
the settlements.'53 The nature of patent monopolies creates an incentive
for both parties in Paragraph IV infringement litigation to find a way to
settle and split the monopoly profits. It is argued that, "[b]ecause such
splitting is contrary to the antitrust laws and the purposes of the HatchWaxman Act, it simply should not be permitted."'54 The incentives to
enter into anticompetitive agreements indicate that some regulation of
reverse payments is needed. Currently, the FTC reviews all reverse
payment settlements and can challenge those settlements it thinks are

"previous" application that triggers the 18o-day delay is the first application. See i8o-Day Generic
Drug Exclusivity for Abbreviated New Drug Applications, 64 Fed. Reg. 42,873, 42,874 (Aug. 6, 1999).
149. 21 U.S.C. § 3 5 5 (j)( 5 )(D)(iii) (stating that if the first applicant withdraws, "no applicant shall
be eligible").
550. See Erika Lietzan & David E. Kom, Issues in the Interpretation of 18o-Day Exclusivity, 62
FoOD & DRuG L.J. 49,72 (2007).
151. Ashlee B. Mehl, Note, The Hatch-Waxman Act and Market Exclusivity for Generic Drug
Manufacturers:An Entitlement or an Incentive?, 81 Cn,.-KENr L. REV. 649,674 (2006).
152. Caffrey & Rotter, supra note is, at 40.

153. This solution has been proposed in legislation. See Preserve Access to Affordable Generics
Act, S.316, 1ioth Cong. § 3(2) (2oo7) (barring settlement agreements if the "ANDA filer receives
anything of value" and in exchange "agrees not to research, develop, manufacture, market, or sell the
ANDA product for any period of time").
154. Caffrey & Rotter, supra note i I,at 4o-41.
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anticompetitive,'5 5 but this oversight is clearly insufficient in light of the
split among the circuit courts. I"6

Commentators have argued that some reverse payments are
reasonable and that an outright ban would be inappropriate. 57' Generic
manufacturers have an enormous incentive to challenge patent holders
since they have "relatively little to lose in litigation precipitated by a
paragraph IV certification beyond litigation costs and the opportunity for
future profits from selling the generic drug.' '-, The average profit of a

successful generic equivalent is exponentially greater than the cost of
litigation.'59 Consequently, the more profitable the drug is for the

pioneer, the greater the incentive is for a generic manufacturer to
challenge the patent. A generic company with a weak case may
nonetheless have a strong incentive to file a Paragraph IV ANDA, and a
patent holder with a strong case still runs an enormous risk by
proceeding to trial.' 6 In high stakes litigation, the party with the most to
lose has the greatest incentive to settle. But even where a patent holder
believes it has a 90% chance of succeeding in litigation, the expected

value associated with the io% risk of losing is so substantial that it is
arguably justified for the patentee to pay the ANDA applicant to settle
of risk management, especially where the patentee is riskas a means
I6I

averse.

155. See Silber & Bye, supra note 129.
156. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
157. See generally, e.g., Sheila Kadura, Note, Is an Absolute Ban on Reverse Payments the
Appropriate Way to Prevent Anticompetitive Agreements Between Branded- and GenericPharmaceuticalCompanies?, 86 TEX. L. REV. 647 (2008).
i58. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 206-07 (2d Cir. 2006).
159. Gardiner Harris & Joanna Slater, Bitter Pills: Drug Makers See 'Branded Generics' Eating
into Profits, WALL ST. J., Apr. I7,2003, at Ai ("[Tihe average profit over the life of a drug following a
successful court case can be more than so times the cost of litigation." (quoting the president of
generic manufacturer Dr. Reddy's Laboratories)).
16o. Kent S. Bernard & Willard K. Tom, Antitrust Treatment of PharmaceuticalPatent Settlements:
The Need for Context and Fidelity to First Principles, 15 FED. CIR. B.J. 617, 631 (2006).
161. See Kadura, supra note 157, at 6 5 9 -6o. But a recent case may change the calculus generics use
when determining whether to file a Paragraph IV challenge. A recent district court ruling required two
generic companies to pay a pioneer's attorney fees because they filed baseless Paragraph IV
challenges in violation of their "duty of care" under the Hatch-Waxman Act. See Takeda Chem. Indus.
v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 459 F. Supp. 2d 227, 230-31 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). The case is currently on appeal to
the Federal Circuit, in which the Generic Pharmaceutical Association (GPhA) filed an amicus brief
arguing that "[rieversal is vital because this aspect of the district court's ruling willundermine the
efficacy of the Hatch-Waxman scheme by deterring future ANDA filings by many companies, keeping
generic drugs off the market and increasing the cost of drugs to the consumers who depend on them."
Brief for the Generic Pharm. Ass'n as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 7, Takeda Chem. Indus.
v. Mylan Labs., Inc., Nos. 2007-1269, 2007-1270 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 21, 2008). If the decision is upheld on
appeal, it may serve to thwart potential generic competitors with weak cases.
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MMA
Neither the Hatch-Waxman Act, nor the Medicare Modernization
Act addressed the issue of authorized generics directly. Because
Congress has remained silent on this issue, courts cannot effectively deal
with this problem since the statutes make it clear that the exclusivity
provisions only apply to generic manufacturers who enter the market via
ANDA applications. The market exclusivity provisions do not prohibit
pioneers from marketing authorized generics during the first ANDA
applicant's 180-day exclusivity period.I6'
In 2004, two generic manufacturers, Mylan Pharmaceuticals and
Teva Pharmaceuticals, filed citizen petitions with the FDA,'6' arguing
that authorized generics should be considered "generic" drugs and
barred from being marketed during the first applicant's exclusivity
period. 64 The FDA denied both petitions on July 2, 2004, stating that the
agency "does not regulate drug prices and has no legal basis on which to
prevent an innovator company from marketing its approved NDA
product at a price that is competitive with that charged by a first generic
applicant to the market."' 6s Both generic manufacturers brought suit to
challenge the FDA's ruling, and in both cases federal district court judges
held in the FDA's favor.'6 Mylan appealed to the Fourth Circuit, and
Teva appealed to the D.C. Circuit, and both courts of appeals affirmed
the district court rulings that the FDA lacks the power to prohibit the
6
marketing of authorized generics during the i80-day exclusivity period. ,
While these circuit court rulings are undoubtedly correct, the
outcome is unfortunate since the "emerging trend" of marketing
authorized generics "will negatively affect the incentive given to generic
manufactures to challenge drug patents.' ' 6 This disincentivizing could be
prevented by barring the marketing of authorized generics from the time
the first Paragraph IV ANDA is filed until the i8o-day exclusivity has
C.

AUTHORIZED GENERICS NOT ADDRESSED BY THE

162. See Teva Pharm. Indus., Ltd. v. Crawford, 41o F.3d 51,55 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

163. A citizen petition is a petition that any person may submit to the FDA to request the FDA
Commissioner to "issue, amend, or revoke" a regulation or order, or to request the Commissioner to
"take or refrain from taking any other form of administrative action." 21 C.F.R. § 10.30 (2008).
164. Mylan Pharm. Petition, supra note 91; Petition from Teva Pharm. U.S., Inc. to Food & Drug
Admin., Citizen Petition No. 2004P-026I (June 9, 2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/
dockets/dailys/o4/Juneo4/o61oo4/o4p-o26i-cpooooi -oi-voli .pdf.
165. Letter from William K. Hubbard, Assoc. Comm'r for Policy and Planning, Food & Drug
Admin., to Stuart A. Williams, Chief Legal Officer, Mylan Pharm., Inc., and James N. Czaban, Heller
Ehrman LLP (July 2, 2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailyslo4/julyo4/o7o7o4/
04p-0075-pdnoooI .pdf.
166. Teva Pharm. Indus. v. FDA, 355 F. Supp. 2d iII, iI9 (D.D.C. 2004); Mylan Pharm., Inc. v.
FDA, No. I:04cv174 (N.D.W. Va. Aug. 30, 2004) (notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice).
167. Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. FDA, 454 F.3d 270, 276-77 (4th Cir. 2006); Teva Pharm. Indus., Ltd. v.
Crawford, 41o F.3d 51, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
168. Petition from Mylan Pharm., Inc. to Food & Drug Admin., supra note 39, at 2.
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expired.'6 Such a solution is justified under the argument that authorized
generics clearly contravene Hatch-Waxman's goal of incentivizing
generic drug marketing. 7 ' But because authorized generics also help
consumers by lowering short-term prices, they are not necessarily
predatory or anticompetitive, and are arguably a legitimate strategy to
protect the innovator's profits. Empirical studies on the economic impact
of authorized generics have been inconclusive, with studies finding both
ways with respect to whether authorized generics harm competition.'
The FTC has been studying the situation, but the results of its study have
not yet been published.'72 Consequently, the solution to the authorized
generic problem is not clear, and would require a thorough analysis of
the policies and economics governing the pharmaceutical industry.'73
D.

OTHER LOOPHOLES

Generic Entry Bottlenecks Due to Litigation
The Medicare Modernization Act also failed to address bottlenecks
created by ongoing litigation between the pioneer and the first generic
challenger. The MMA provides that forfeiture is triggered seventy-five
days after the date of a final court decision "from which no appeal (other
than a petition to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari) has been or
can be taken" holding the NDA-holder's patent invalid or not
infringed.'74 But this provision has been criticized as being ineffective
because the statute requires a final ruling on patent invalidity or
noninfringement from the Federal Circuit before forfeiture is triggered.'75
Even where the trial court finds in favor of the first ANDA applicant in
the infringement or declaratory judgment suit, the applicant will often be
hesitant to begin marketing its generic drug for fear of having the finding
reversed by the Federal Circuit. , 6 This means generic entry can be
delayed for years while the first ANDA filer waits for an appellate court
i.

169. Chen, supra note 34, at 511-12.
170. Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 991 (D.C. Cir. 199o); see also H.R. REP. No. 98-857, Pt.
I, at 14-15 (1984).
171. Chen, supra note 34, at 469.
172. See Notice of Authorized Generic Drug Study, 71 Fed. Reg. 16,779, 16,780 (Apr. 4, 2oo6),
availableat http://www.ftc.gov/os/2oo6/0 3 /Po62105AuthorizedGenericDrugStudyFRNotice.pdf.
173. In depth analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this Note. But see Chen, supra note 34, at

478. Chen argues that the authorized generic practice clearly harms competition. See id. Since
authorized generics generally enter the market before the ANDA applicant's equivalent, the
authorized generic will gain the "first mover" advantage and the ANDA applicant will be burdened
with the "switching costs" of late entry. Id. at 478-79. "Because second place is only marginally better
but immensely more expensive than third place, there is no incentive to bear the risks and costs of a
pre-expiration patent challenge. The result is that rational generic firms may forego potential
Paragraph IV challenges when faced with this unfavorable cost-benefit calculus." Id. at 479.
174. 21 U.S.C. § 35 5 (J)(5 )(D)(i)(I)(bb)(AA) (2006) (emphasis added).
575. Interview with Seth Silber, Of Counsel, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati PC, in Wash., D.C.
(Feb. 21, 2oo8).

176. Id.
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ruling. Arguably, this problem could be fixed by having forfeiture of the
exclusivity period triggered by a district court ruling, instead of
restricting it to an appellate court ruling. But because the Federal Circuit77
frequently reverses lower court rulings on patent claims construction,
both generics and patent
holders may be dissatisfied with a solution
78
prone to so much error.
Voluntary Delistingof Patentsfrom the Orange Book After
ParagraphIV Certification Filing
Another method that pioneers have been using to deter generic
challengers is to voluntarily delist their patents from the Orange Book
after a Paragraph IV certification has been filed. 79 Once a patent is
removed from the Orange Book, the generic challenger must amend its
ANDA from a Paragraph IV to a Paragraph I certification.' 8° Since only
Paragraph IV applicants are entitled to the 180-day exclusivity period, by
voluntarily delisting its patent, the patent holder is able to prevent the
first generic challenger from securing marketing exclusivity.
Furthermore, even if the first filer's ANDA is approved, the first filer
may be hesitant to begin competing with the patent holder because the
patentee can still sue for infringement once the first filer starts selling its
generic drug.' 8' Generic manufacturers almost never enter the market
until at least a district court has held the NDA holder's patent is invalid
or not infringed.' Additionally, the revised Act provides that delisting
the patent from the Orange Book is a forfeiture event, which would force
a first-filing applicant with an approved ANDA to enter the market
within seventy-five days in order to avoid forfeiting the exclusivity
2.

period. ,83
177. See Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More
Predictable?,9 LEwqS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 234-36 (2005) (reviewing empirical studies showing that
the Federal Circuit overturns 25-50% of district court claims construction decisions); see also Cybor
Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (Judge Rader asserting that
the Federal Circuit had overturned 40% of district court claims construction decisions).
178. Interview with Seth Silber, supra note 175.
179. See Lietzan & Korn, supranote 15o, at 67-69.
18o. 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(12)(viii)(B) (2008). Recall that Paragraph I ANDAs are used when the
pioneer's drug is not patented or no patent information has been filed with the FDA. 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(a)(A)(vii)(I) (2oo6); see also supra note 38 and accompanying text.
181. It is beyond the scope of this Note to analyze the issues related to manipulation of the Orange
Book by NDA holders. The Author's understanding is that if a pioneer's patent is not listed in the
OrangeBook, the pioneer can only avail itself of normal infringement actions under 35 U.S.C. § 271 of
the Patent Act. But if the pioneer's patent is listed in the Orange Book, then itcan take advantage of
the Hatch-Waxman provisions, such as the thirty-month stay, etc. See generally Natalie M. Derzko,
The Impact of Recent Reforms of the Hatch-Waxman Scheme on OrangeBook Strategic Behavior and
PharmaceuticalInnovation, 45 IDEA 165 (2005).
182. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 39, at vii.
183. 21 U.S.C. § 355(J)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb)(CC) (stating that the exclusivity period is forfeited seventyfive days after "[tihe patent information submitted under subsection (b) or (c) is withdrawn by the
[NDA] holder").
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In Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. v. Leavitt, the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals addressed the question of "whether the FDA may delist a
patent upon the request of the NDA holder after a generic manufacturer
has filed an ANDA containing a paragraph IV certification so that the
effect of delisting is to deprive the applicant of a period of marketing
exclusivity."'"" Recognizing that the "FDA's delisting policy diminishes
the incentive for a manufacturer of generic drugs to challenge a patent
listed in the Orange Book," the court held that the FDA may not delist a
patent from the Orange Book after the submission of an ANDA with a
Paragraph IV certification to that patent.'5
Notwithstanding the D.C. Circuit's holding in Ranbaxy, the issue of
whether NDA holders may delist their patents from the Orange Book
still seems to be an open issue at the FDA. On March 22, 2005, Cobalt
Pharmaceuticals filed a Paragraph IV ANDA for Precose (acarbose
'6
tablets), a diabetes treatment marketed by Bayer Pharmaceuticals. 8
Bayer never sued Cobalt for infringement, and in April 2007, Bayer8
requested that its patent for Precose be delisted from the Orange Book.
In a startling decision, the FDA allowed Bayer to delist its patent and
then declared that Cobalt forfeited its I8o-day exclusivity for failing to
market its generic equivalent within seventy-five days of the patent
delisting. '88 In the decision, the Agency explained that Bayer could delist
its patent for Precose because Ranbaxy does not apply to post-MMA

184. 469 F.3d 120, 125 (D.C. Cir. 2006); FDA Solicits Comments on 18o-Day Exclusivity Forfeiture
& Orange Book Patent "Delisting" Issues, FDA Law Blog, http://www.fdalawblog.net/ (Sept. 26, 2007,
01:36 EST).
185. Ranbaxy, 469 F. 3 d at 126 (emphasis added); Kurt R. Karst, Teva Sues FDA After the Agency
Refuses to Relist RISPERDAL Patent and Recognize the Company's i8o-Day Exclusivity Eligibility,
FDA Law Blog, http://www.fdalawblog.net/ (Mar. 7, 2oo8, o8:o6 EST).
186. Letter from Gary J. Buehler, Dir., Office of Generic Drugs, Ctr. for Drug Evaluation and
Research, to Anonymous ANDA Applicant (Sept. 26, 2007), available at http://www.fda.gov/
ohrms/dockets/dockets/o7no417/o7n-0417-letoooi-volh.pdf [hereinafter Buehler, FDA Letter to Cobalt
2007].
187. Id.
188. Letter from Gary J. Buehler, Dir., Office of Generic Drugs, Ctr. for Drug Evaluation and
Research, to William A. Rakoczy, Rakoczy, Molino, Mazzochi & Siwik LLP, at 52 (May 7, 2oo8),
available at http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectld=o9oooo648o55265c&
disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf [hereinafter Buehler, FDA Letter to Cobalt 2o08]; see also
Kurt R. Karst, FDA Determines that Cobalt Forfeited 18o-Day Exclusivity for Generic PRECOSE;
Agency is Sued Yet Another Time, FDA Law Blog, http://www.fdalawblog.net/ (May i1, 2o08, o7:58
EST). Note that as of September 26, 2007, Cobalt's ANDA had not yet been approved. Buhler, FDA
Letter to Cobalt 2007, supra note 186. On that day, FDA sent a letter to Cobalt soliciting its opinion
on whether it was permissible for the FDA to delist Bayer's patent because more than thirty months
had passed since Cobalt's first filing and it had failed to enter the market. Id. In applying the forfeiture
provisions, the FDA found the "earlier of' date under subpart (aa) was September 22, 2007 (thirty
months after the ANDA was filed). Buehler, FDA Letter to Cobalt 2008, supra, at 6. Similarly, the
"later of" date under subpart (bb) was June 30, 2007 (seventy-five days after Bayer delisted its patent).
Id. at 7. Therefore, Cobalt forfeited their exclusivity as of September 22, 2007, the "later of' date
under 21 U.S.C. § 355J)(5)(D)(i)(I). Id. at 7-8; see also supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
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cases. ' In response, Cobalt filed suit against the FDA seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief."9 As of this writing, the suit against the
FDA is pending, but it is clear that the interpretative issues surrounding
manipulation of Orange Book patent listings are still being used to
discourage generic challengers. To prevent this abuse, Hatch-Waxman
should be revised to either (1) explicitly prohibit an NDA holder from
delisting its patent after a Paragraph IV ANDA is filed, or (2) allow the
first filer to retain the 180-day exclusivity if the NDA holder voluntarily
delists its patent. Both revisions would align with Congress' intent to
promote the timely marketing of generic drugs.
CONCLUSION

The Medicare Modernization Act has failed to remedy exploitation
of the Hatch-Waxman Act by pharmaceutical patent holders. Prior to the
MMA, the main areas of abuse by pioneers consisted of (I) using
multiple thirty-month stays to keep generic challengers from getting
ANDA approval, (2) delaying generic competition by entering into
reverse payments with generic challengers, and (3) responding to
imminent generic competition by launching authorized generics. The
MMA succeed in eliminating the first problem by limiting patent holders
to a single thirty-month stay. But it has been tragically unsuccessful at
addressing the remaining problems. The MMA attempted to remedy
bottlenecks in ANDA approval by creating provisions that would lead to
the forfeiture of the i8o-day exclusivity period, but these flawed
provisions are easily avoided by drafting settlement agreements that
contain no finding of patent invalidity or noninfringement. Furthermore,
Congress's hope that the FTC would be able to stop anticompetitive payfor-delay settlements was misguided in light of the split that has
developed among the federal circuit courts. Congress clearly needs to
return to this area to correct the flawed forfeiture provisions and to
directly address the legality of pay-for-delay settlements. Additionally,
the MMA completely ignored the issue of authorized generics, such that
the practice has thrived and expanded in the ensuing years. 9' This area is
complicated by the fact that it is not clear whether authorized generics
actually help or hurt consumers. Hopefully, the pending FTC study will
answer this issue and provide Congress with guidance on how to regulate
this area.
189. Buehler, FDA Letter to Cobalt 2008, supra note 188, at 8 ("[T]he Ranbaxy court noted that
the decisions rendered by the FDA and the district court had been made pursuant to the Act 'as it
stood before the MMA and, because the MMA was not made retroactive ... this decision is also
geared to the Act pre-MMA."' (citing Ranbaxy Labs. Ltd. v. Leavitt, 469 F.3 d 120, 122 (D.C. Cir.
2006))).
19o. Complaint at 2, Cobalt Labs. Inc. v. FDA, No. i:o8-cv-oo798-RBW (D.D.C. May 8, 2008).
191. See generally Robert P. Reznick & James B. Kobak, Jr., Authorized Generics:Still Legal-and
Holding, PHARM. EXEC., Sept. I, 2oo6.

